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Registros recuperados: 15 | |
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Guirkinger, Catherine; Boucher, Stephen R.. |
This paper evaluates the performance of a rural credit market in Peru. We develop a model that shows that collateral requirements imposed by lenders in response to asymmetric information can lead not just to quantity rationing but also to transaction cost rationing and risk rationing. Just like quantity rationing, these two additional forms of non-price rationing adversely affect farm resource allocation and productivity. We test the insights of the model using a panel data set from Northern Peru. We estimate the returns to productive endowments for constrained and unconstrained households using a switching regression model. We find that, consistent with the theory, productivity is independent of endowments for unconstrained households but is tightly... |
Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Financial Economics; International Development. |
Ano: 2007 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/6882 |
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Boucher, Stephen R.; Guirkinger, Catherine; Trivelli, Carolina. |
This paper provides a methodological bridge leading from the well-developed theory of credit rationing to the less developed territory of empirically identifying credit constraints. We begin by developing a simple model showing that credit constraints may take three forms: quantity rationing, transaction cost rationing, and risk rationing. Each form of non-price rationing adversely affects household resource allocation and thus should be accounted for in empirical analyses of credit market performance. We then outline a survey strategy to directly classify households as credit unconstrained or constrained and, if constrained, to further identify which of the three non-price rationing mechanisms is at play. We discuss several practical issues that arise due... |
Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Financial Economics. |
Ano: 2006 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/6883 |
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Lybbert, Travis J.; Galarza, Francisco B.; McPeak, John G.; Barrett, Christopher B.; Boucher, Stephen R.; Carter, Michael R.; Chantarat, Sommarat; Fadlaoui, Aziz; Mude, Andrew G.. |
The effective design and implementation of interventions that reduce vulnerability and poverty require a solid understanding of underlying poverty dynamics and associated behavioral responses. Stochastic and dynamic benefit streams can make it difficult for the poor to learn the value of such interventions to them. We explore how dynamic field experiments can help (i) intended beneficiaries to learn and understand these complicated benefit streams, and (ii) researchers to better understand how the poor respond to risk when faced with nonlinear welfare dynamics. We discuss and analyze dynamic risk valuation experiments in Morocco, Peru, and Kenya. |
Tipo: Journal Article |
Palavras-chave: Poverty; Risk and uncertainty; Dynamics; Experiments; Kenya; Morocco; Peru; International Development; Research Methods/ Statistical Methods; Risk and Uncertainty. |
Ano: 2010 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/90791 |
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Roth, Michael J.; Boucher, Stephen R.; Francisco, Antonio. |
Beginning in January 1991, the U.S. Agency for International Development funded a series of studies on land, employment, and financial markets in the peri-urban areas of Maputo. Beginning in September 1991, a land-market survey involving 121 households and 162 plots of land was administered in two peri-urban green zones of Maputo-districts 4 and 6. Households were queried about their land-settlement histories, mode of land acquisition, terms and conditions of transfer, land rights, size of holdings, perceptions of tenure security, land-use practices, commercial input use, hired labor, agricultural sales and revenues, nonfarm employment and earnings, and general demographic characteristics. The present study reports findings from the land-market survey... |
Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Land Economics/Use. |
Ano: 1995 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/12755 |
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Boucher, Stephen R.; Carter, Michael R.. |
This paper explores the productivity and income distribution effects of asymmetric information and risk preferences on the credit market. A model of contract design in the presence of moral hazard is developed in which competitive, risk neutral lenders offer contracts to risk averse agents who hold the option to invest capital and labor time in an entrepreneurial activity. The model gives rise to the potential for quantity rationing and an additional form of non-price rationing called risk rationing. Both quantity and risk rationed agents would seek credit and carry out the entrepreneurial activity in a first best, or symmetric information world. When information is asymmetric, the menu of available loan contracts shrinks. In equilibrium, neither type of... |
Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Risk and Uncertainty. |
Ano: 2001 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/12675 |
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Registros recuperados: 15 | |
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